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ANALYSIS
The Role of Policy Experts in Social Policy-Making in Russia: The Case of 
Housing
Marina Khmelnitskaya, Helsinki
Abstract
Policy expertise and policy experts are expected to play an important role in the policy-making process, both 
around the world and in Russia. However, the patterns of long-term policy shifts involving technical expert-
ise are insufficiently understood. To what extent do experts influence policy in Russia? To date, this ques-
tion remains unanswered. These issues are considered here in the case of housing policy.
Ideas and Interests in the Russian Policy 
Process
Comparative research argues that the influence of 
experts is “real but limited”. Key decisions about the 
choice between policy alternatives, specifically includ-
ing “big” ideas that guide policy, often described as 
policy paradigms, are taken within the realm of pol-
itics and relate to the issue of political authority. More-
over, when decisions relate to the choice of policy instru-
ments—which represent elements of policy of a smaller 
magnitude—coherent policy plans put forward by 
experts sometimes change beyond recognition under 
the influence of diverse stake-holders in the process of 
policy adoption and policy implementation. For this 
reason, many expert proposals never get off the ground.
In the context of Russian politics, this view of the 
policy process and expert influence over it are intensi-
fied further by the particularities of Russia’s non-dem-
ocratic political system. The personalist dimension of the 
Russian decision-making process, involving the personal 
charisma of the Russian president projected through 
the media, and his central position within the vertically 
organized, informal governance networks define one 
important strain of the literature on decision-making.
The “institutionalist” view of policy-making in Rus-
sia complements the personalist perspective by empha-
sizing a more nuanced role of bureaucratic policy actors. 
This view holds that a more regularized bureaucratic pro-
cedure for making policy decisions is as important as the 
personal interventions of the president. In the absence of 
the genuine representation of popular interests in Rus-
sia, bureaucratic groupings, such as the social and eco-
nomic-financial blocs of the government, act as proxy 
defenders of respective constituencies within Russian 
society. When making everyday adjustments to policy or 
choosing between alternative policy instruments, these 
actors become interlocked in a protracted policy battle 
and often endless policy consultations. In this respect 
the annual budgetary process provides one set of pol-
icy deadlines which push actors to make policy choices. 
The president prefers to interfere only in exceptional cir-
cumstances when no side is prepared to take responsi-
bility for crucial decisions—for instance with the deci-
sion to forego the second indexation of pensions during 
the 2016 budgetary process. In this way, the president 
uses his political capital sparingly, seeking to maintain 
his political authority.
Both the “autocratic” and “bureaucratic” perspec-
tives allow a  role for technical expertise and policy 
experts to influence policy; a more subservient role from 
the first perspective and a more active one—from the 
second. From the first perspective, the legitimacy of the 
state in Russia is, to an important extent, technocratic, 
i.e. deriving from the claim of “doing the right thing 
for the country”, rather than being based on democratic 
procedure. In this light, the recent return of Alexei Kud-
rin to “official politics” serves as a good example. At the 
end of May 2016 Kudrin was elected Deputy Chair of 
the Presidential Economic Council and took a  lead-
ing role at the renowned Center for Strategic Develop-
ment (CSR), the organization responsible for develop-
ing Vladimir Putin’s first pre-election program in 2000, 
which became known as the “Gref Program”. Kudrin, 
with his colleagues from the Committee for Civic Ini-
tiatives (KGI),1 and other highly qualified experts from 
research organizations as well as from government min-
istries, are currently working on a new strategy for the 
country’s development after 2018, which is positioned 
to become Putin’s campaign platform for the 2018 pres-
idential elections. This association with qualified experts 
contributes to the legitimacy claim of the current leader-
ship, that finds itself in a highly complex domestic, eco-
nomic, and international setting.
Such developments are not without historical preced-
ent. At complex moments of leadership transition, Rus-
sian leaders have tended to form centers of extra-depart-
mental expertise whose staff later were often appointed 
to key government jobs. This was the case with the 
1 Formed by Kudrin after his resignation from the government in 
2011, following a dispute with Dmitry Medvedev over budget 
priorities.
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CSR at the start of Putin’s presidency. Several of the 
CSR experts, notably Herman Gref and Elvira Nabiu-
lina, have since occupied important policy-making posi-
tions. Similarly, the Institute for Contemporary Devel-
opment (INSOR) think-tank was associated with the 
start of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency in 2008 and the 
four National Priority Projects. The joint team of the 
Higher School of Economics (HSE) and the Russian 
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Pub-
lic Administration (RANEPA) produced Strategy 2020 
in 2011 at the start of Putin’s third presidential term. 
At the same time, historical examples also demonstrate 
that experts become easy scapegoats for policy failures. 
For instance, the failure of the initiative to monetize in-
kind benefits (l'goty) that led to mass protests in 2005 
was blamed on liberal policy-makers in and outside the 
government and their poor policy designs.
Yet another dimension of technocratic governance in 
Russia which helps to elaborate the second, institution-
alized, view of the policy process is associated with what 
we may describe as knowledge monopolies that emerge 
around Russian executive structures. A historical process 
tracing of policy developments in specific policy spheres 
is needed for the analysis of this phenomenon and its 
change over time. We may distinguish among its several 
aspects. Specifically, recent studies have found that in 
Russia the rates of rotation by government staff among 
individual ministries are low. This stability of person-
nel creates insular specialist cultures and monopolies 
on policy expertise within individual ministries. Such 
monopolies, however, extend beyond executive institu-
tions to involve experts at research institutes and NGOs 
working in different spheres of economic and social pol-
icy. The presence of informal inter-personal networks, 
an important feature of the Russian institutional setting, 
is responsible for producing close bonds among state 
ministries and specific groups of non-state policy experts.
Within individual areas of policy—I will consider 
the example of housing policy below—a tight network of 
expert policy “insiders,” including state officials and non-
state policy specialists, represents the core of the policy-
making community. Policy ideas shared by this group 
provide the basis for policy elaboration at any given time. 
The central position of well-connected experts, moreover, 
allows them access to greater economic and administra-
tive resources compared to the experts located on the 
fringes of the policy community. All actors belonging 
to the overall community in a given sphere are usually 
well aware of differing policy proposals put forward by 
competing “advocacy coalitions”. They regularly take 
part in joint scientific conferences and events. Yet, it is 
the views of the tight policy network in the middle of 
the specialist community with close ties to the branch 
ministry that has real influence over formulating pol-
icy proposals and writing policy documents.
This pattern is usually only deepened by the presence 
of international cooperation. Particularly, in the 1990s 
but in the subsequent period as well, the network’s core 
in Russia had greater resources to establish and sustain 
such cooperation. At the same time, research finds that 
international agencies have an affinity to choose well 
connected local expert partners. This only further rein-
forces the established knowledge monopolies.
What becomes difficult under such circumstances is 
change in policy ideas and consequently policy change 
itself, particularly the paradigmatic replacement type 
of change referred to earlier. Three mechanisms can be 
identified describing how such change can occur. One 
of them involves the perceived failures or limitations of 
earlier-adopted policies that are revealed at the stage of 
policy implementation. Failures lead insider experts to 
adopt alternative ideas and/or to the inclusion in the 
central network of previously marginalized experts and 
their proposals. Another mechanism relates to changes 
in policy-related knowledge disseminated through inter-
national policy communities and international contacts. 
The third kind of influence is the increased proximity 
with parallel policy networks active in neighboring pol-
icy domains. When any of these dynamics coincide—
change is more likely.
The connection between specialist policy ideas and 
political actors’ material interests is important. Knowl-
edge monopolies in Russia are sustained because their 
proposals fit with, and are supported by, the material 
interests of powerful policy actors: the blocs and group-
ings within the Russian government and the Russian 
president. Yet, the affinity between the politicians’ inter-
ests and ideas emanating from expert advisors should 
not overshadow the important independent impact of 
specialist proposals on policy formation. Interests, in 
political popularity for instance, and internalized beliefs 
of the most powerful political actor in Russia, the pres-
ident, matter greatly for the chances of policy proposals 
to be implemented. Yet, an evolution in expert ideas can 
also precede a change in interests, as the case of Russian 
housing policy below demonstrates.
Experts and Housing Policy-Making
Within the housing sphere in the 1990s, private housing 
ownership was prioritized by the network that emerged 
around the branch ministry, the Ministry of Construc-
tion (Minstroy). This policy preference was part and 
parcel of the international advice given to the Russian 
government at the time and supported by international 
housing advisors. To be fair, other forms of housing own-
ership—rented and cooperative types of tenure—were 
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included in policy documents by the policy-makers as 
well, but without being prioritized. Housing privatiza-
tion to current tenants that turned them into a class of 
property owners chimed well with the overall thrust of 
the post-socialist economic restructuring process, which 
emphasized the private ownership of economic assets. 
A large proportion of the public liked the idea of becom-
ing owners of their apartments. Yet, there remained a sig-
nificant minority who preferred not to privatize.
By 2000 the policy vision based on the predomi-
nance of private ownership was successful to a degree: 
60 percent of housing became privately owned, leaving 
40 percent in municipal ownership. Among the group 
who preferred to remain municipal tenants, many were 
wary of high property taxes that could be imposed on 
private housing, and of being made responsible for the 
costs of expensive major repairs of apartment buildings 
where most were situated. Given the poor state of repair 
of a large part of the housing stock in Russia this was 
a frightening prospect. Introduction of property taxes 
and the transfer of the costs of major repairs from the 
state to private owners were among the instruments 
belonging to the private ownership paradigm and advo-
cated by the policy network.
These policy plans did not materialize during the 
1990s though, partially because of the weakness of the 
Russian state administration combined with opposi-
tion from the State Duma to the introduction of a lib-
eral new Housing Code developed by the network of 
experts in and around Minstroy. During the 2000s the 
capacity of the state increased, while the attenuation of 
Russian democracy meant the election of a compliant 
parliament, allowing the adoption of the new Housing 
Code in 2004. The Code made major repairs a responsi-
bility of apartment owners and reduced the entitlement 
to free municipal housing provision to the poorest five 
percent of the population. Yet, the populist motives of 
the authorities and the availability of resources allowed 
a statist solution to the problem of expensive “capital 
repairs”, through the establishment of a dedicated state 
Foundation, to be used in the second half of the 2000s.
However, the vision of housing policy based on the 
predominance of private tenure, promoted by the hous-
ing network, reached a dead-end in relation to the afford-
ability of mortgage funding for the majority of the Rus-
sians who needed to improve their housing conditions. 
Mortgages offered by Russian banks remained unafford-
able to the majority of the public. Thus, in the mid-2000s, 
after the adoption of the new Housing Code, the failure 
of the idea of mass housing ownership in Russia became 
widely perceived by the public and by the expert com-
munity. We may also describe this period, starting in 
2005, as the end of the dominance of the private own-
ership paradigm and a turning to a new model of mixed 
ownership in Russia.
In addition, in terms of the interests of influential 
policy-makers, 2005 was also marked by social protests 
against the monetization of benefits and indicating pub-
lic anxiety surrounding reforms in the social sphere gen-
erally, including housing. This contributed to the greater 
openness of the political leadership to alternative expert 
ideas proposing new avenues for social reforms.
From this time onwards, alternative policy experts 
advocating the use of rental and cooperative tenure forms 
in addition to the private form found a place in housing 
networks. Thus, in the policy documents adopted since 
the late 2000s—including different versions of the state 
program “Affordable Housing”,2 the May 2012 decree 
N600 on housing, and the 2016 new priority projects—
the development of rental housing and cooperatives, par-
ticularly rentals, is invariably emphasized. Even an idea 
to set up a special state corporation for the development 
of rental housing was considered in 2011–12, but was 
not followed through.
In addition, there was stronger coordination with 
other networks in social and economic spheres to 
improve the affordability of mortgage finance. This 
involved making the terms of mortgage borrowing more 
affordable (with assistance from state banks and the gov-
ernment mortgage Agency, AHML) and increasing the 
income levels of the public, particularly those employed 
in the public sector.
The fact that these ideas have been poorly imple-
mented in reality (i.e. the development of rental hous-
ing) between the late 2000s and the current economic 
crisis3 is due to the influence of political interests. More 
precisely, due to the contradiction between the interest 
to produce affordable housing options for families with 
different levels of income and the pursuit of political 
popularity. Specifically, the free privatization of state 
housing—which by 2017 increased the share of private 
ownership in Russia to over 90 percent—was extended 
numerous times. This has meant that the local munic-
ipalities lacked incentives to invest in the construction 
of new rental accommodation or upgrade existing rental 
housing stock. These at any point could be “lost” to pri-
vatization. The current period of economic crisis and the 
squeeze on public finances has led to efforts to increase 
the collection of property taxes on housing and land. 
These higher costs made the ownership option less attrac-
2 Latest version from April 2014
3 The crisis hit the mortgage market in late 2014, which required 
the state to intervene with a Program of state assistance, and 
reached housing construction with a delay in 2016.
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tive to the remaining tenants and reduce the political 
costs of ending housing privatization.
In January 2017 the State Duma voted to end the 
policy of “free for all” housing privatization in the coun-
try, a move which could have concluded a 25-year his-
tory of an unprecedented free distribution of state hous-
ing property in Russia. However, by mid-February the 
deputies had changed their minds under the influence 
of President Putin, who had perhaps concluded that 
this decision could be damaging to his political popu-
larity. The law about permanent housing privatization 
was signed by the president at the end of February. This 
decision was dictated by the political interests of Rus-
sia’s top leaders and has, for now, undermined the imple-
mentation of alternative expert ideas with regard to the 
development of housing rents. While policy efforts in 
this direction will continue, they will be complicated 
by the continuation of privatization.
Conclusion
What makes the area of housing different from that of 
pension provision, for example, is the fact that housing 
is a highly localized policy sphere. Local and regional 
authorities provide the lion’s share of budget funding (for 
the upkeep of municipal housing and communal areas 
of multi-apartment blocks) and a multitude of housing 
construction and maintenance firms work in the housing 
sphere. This means that at the federal level there were no 
powerful stake-holders to oppose the ideas of alternative 
policy experts and block their introduction in legislation, 
apart from those of the top leadership, which I have just 
addressed. In the area of pension provision, by contrast, 
where most funding is distributed at the federal level (by 
the Pension Fund of Russia and increasingly the state 
budget), the battle between defenders of the old pay-as-
you-go system and the alternative model based on pri-
vate savings has been intense in recent years. The 2016 
budgetary policy cycle was no exception.
Many scholarly analyses of the Russian pension 
reform process have emphasized the interest-related 
side of this policy dynamic. A focus on policy expert-
ise and experts in this area as well as in other areas of 
policy in Russia may reveal the presence of knowledge 
monopolies, the bifurcation of policy communities sup-
plying ideas to the policy process and their transforma-
tion over time. Attention to such important knowledge-
related elements of the policy process can help a better 
understanding of the trajectories of policy shifts in indi-
vidual areas of policy in Russia.
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ANALYSIS
Russian Trade Unions between Neo-corporatism and Direct Political 
Involvement: The “Dual” System of Labor Interests’ Representation1
Irina Olimpieva, St. Petersburg
Abstract
This article outlines the design of the “dual” system of labor interests’ representation in Russia, which com-
prises two “parallel” institutional mechanisms used by trade unions to participate in policymaking: the for-
mal neo-corporatist system of social partnership and the informal institution of direct political participa-
tion. The analysis suggests that Russian trade unions have achieved more influence in policy-making through 
informal political channels and tools than via formal social partnership institutions. The assessment of the 
real impact of trade unions on labor and social policy is difficult, because of the informal character of the 
direct political participation. However, we assume that it is underestimated and requires further research.
Social Partnership as a Neo-corporatist 
Institution of Labor Interest Representation
Social partnership (SP) is a neo-corporatist institution 
for labor interest representation. The core of the social 
partnership model is the ideology of social dialogue 
aimed at coordinating the contradicting interests of 
labor and capital via the inclusion of trade unions and 
employers’ associations in policymaking. In practice, the 
process of interest coordination takes the form of nego-
tiations between “social partners” and the state within 
the framework of tripartite commissions and results in 
so-called social pacts—formal multi-policy agreements 
among governments, unions, and employers. Before 
1989, social partnership was primarily a phenomenon of 
continental Western Europe. After the collapse of com-
munism, the model was introduced in Russia (as well 
as in other Eastern European countries) to become the 
foundation of a new industrial relations system.
Tripartism is generally beneficial for trade unions 
because it guarantees inclusion of labor interests in the 
policymaking process. For Russian trade unions (such as 
the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, 
FNPR), this model was even more attractive because it 
legitimated their position in the new economic and polit-
ical order. However, the effectiveness of the tripartite 
model was initially under question due to the principle 
contradiction between its neo-corporatist nature and the 
neoliberal scenario of economic reforms. The effective-
ness of Western European neo-corporatism was based 
on well-functioning market mechanisms, developed 
trade unionism, and was closely linked to social dem-
ocratic politics. None of these basic preconditions were 
present in the Russian context and remain absent today. 
Nevertheless, the government welcomed social partner-
1 This article was made possible thanks to support from the Cen-
tre of Excellence in Russian studies: Choices of Russian Mod-
ernization, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki.
ship for a number of reasons. One was the fear of social 
protests as a reaction to economic liberalization and the 
inevitable drop in the living standards of the popula-
tion. The government wanted to share responsibilities 
for the reforms with “social partners.” A no less impor-
tant factor was the pressure from international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and OECD, 
that wanted to ensure social peace in exchange for the 
financial support of economic reforms. The institutional 
transfer of the social partnership model was therefore 
driven by political, rather than economic reasons and 
resulted in so-called “illusory corporatism”2 and actual 
inefficiency of the tripartite institutions.
Tripartite Institutions in Russia: Low 
Policymaking Capacity
The establishment of the social partnership system began 
in the early nineties with the presidential decree “On 
Social Partnership and Conciliation of Labor Disputes” 
(1991) and the governmental decree “About the Russian 
Tripartite Commission on Regulation of Socio-Labor 
Relations” (1992). In 2002, the new Labor Code had 
finally solidified the new system of industrial relations 
based on a social partnership ideology. The SP system 
in Russia includes two vertical dimensions (territorial 
and industrial), eight levels of negotiations (federation, 
region, industrial branch/sector, territory, and enter-
prise), and seven types of social agreements depending 
on the number of partners (tripartite or bipartite) and 
the content of regulation (tariff agreements or general 
agreements). The main tripartite body at the federal level 
is the Russian Tripartite Commission for the Regula-
tion of Social-Labor Relations (RTC), which includes 90 
representatives of the partners and the government (30 
from each party). The employers are represented by sev-
2 Ost, D. (2001) “Illusory corporatism: Tripartism in the service 
of Neoliberalism”, Politics and Society, Vol. 28, No. 4: 503–530.
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eral national business associations, such as the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Chamber 
of Commerce, and All-Russian Public Organization of 
Small and Medium-sized Businesses, and the top man-
agers of the largest Russian companies. The employees 
side includes 27 representatives of the FNPR, which 
covers about 30 percent of Russia’s labor force, and three 
representatives of the so-called “alternative” or “free” 
unions that encompass about three percent of workers. 
Seven working groups within the framework of the tri-
partite commission negotiate issues in specified areas. 
The General Agreement between social partners provides 
basic principles of labor regulation at the federal level 
and is adopted by the RTC every second year.
While tripartite institutions look good on paper, 
in practice, they provide weak opportunities for trade 
unions to influence policymaking. The documents 
produced by the Commission have only a recommen-
dary character. As an advisory body, the RTC can 
only provide consultations to federal state institutions 
regarding socio-economic policy and suggest amend-
ments to federal and other normative acts. RTC deci-
sions are not binding and vetoes cannot be overridden. 
General Agreements often have a declarative character 
that mostly demonstrates good intentions shared by 
the partners, rather than a plan of action or a compro-
mise. Until recently, the work of the RTC was mostly 
reduced to approval of the documents that had already 
been adopted by the government.3 The domination of 
the state in policymaking creates an actual imbalance of 
power within the Russian Tripartite Commission, forc-
ing unions and employers to fight for direct influence 
over the state instead of negotiating with each other.
During the 1990s, a number of laws and amend-
ments were adopted to improve the work of the RTC (to 
convert it from “a club for the exchange of views”4 into 
a real policymaking body). However, the introduced 
changes had a superficial nature (such as, e.g., changes in 
the number of participants in the RTC or in the mech-
anisms of employers’ representation, etc.), while the low 
institutional status of the Commission remained intact. 
After 2000, the evolution of the SP system continued 
through the improvements of General Agreements. The 
agreements started increasingly focusing on more prac-
tical issues of socio-economic regulation, suggesting 
changes in the tariff system and the federal normative 
3 Vinogradova E., Kozina I., Cook L.J. (2012) “Russian labor: Qui-
escence and conflict”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
Vol. 45, No. 3–4: 219–231.
4 Mikhail Shmakov, FNPR President, cited in Ashwin, S. and 
Clarke, S. (2003) Russian Trade Unions and Industrial Relations 
in Transition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.: 148
system of social planning.5 However, the non-obligatory 
character of the RTC decisions nullified these positive 
trends. For example, the 2008–2010 General Agreement 
suggested linking the level of the minimum wage guar-
anteed by the state to the minimum subsistence level as 
an urgent necessity. It was a rare case when an initia-
tive of the trade unions achieved a consensus among the 
social parties. However, the provision has not been real-
ized; currently, the minimum wage in Russia still consti-
tutes about 55 percent of what is required for minimum 
subsistence.6 The inefficiency of the social partnership 
system forces trade unions to look for alternative ways 
to represent labor interests.
Direct Political Participation as an 
Alternative Mechanism for Labor Interest 
Representation
In European democracies, corporatist mechanisms of 
labor interest representation are often complemented by 
the political activities of trade unions. Trade unions use 
different electoral and lobbying strategies to gain direct 
access to the legislative process. In Russia, trade unions 
are not allowed to participate in elections; the Consti-
tution of 1993 also deprived them of the right to intro-
duce legislation directly to the State Duma. Hence, tri-
partite negotiations are the only legitimate option for 
them to participate in policymaking. Nevertheless, since 
the beginning of the 1990s trade unions have been suc-
cessfully utilizing a wide range of electoral and lobbying 
tools, adapting them to the peculiarities of the politi-
cal and economic context. During the period of polit-
ical pluralism in the beginning of the 90s, the unions’ 
electoral strategies resembled “political party shopping” 
(Cook, 2007). Deprived of their rights of political ini-
tiative, labor unions aligned with any party ready to 
promote their interests in the Duma, including even 
ideological opponents such as the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, representing the main 
Russian industrial lobby and the biggest employer asso-
ciation. They allied with this group as part of the Civic 
Union political block in 1992. During the 1995 and 
1999 State Duma elections, the FNPR created its own 
political bloc, the Union of Labor. Although unsuccess-
ful in the 1995 electoral campaign, the Union of Labor, 
in alliance with the Fatherland (Otechestvo) party, won 
about 20 seats in the parliament during the 1999 elec-
tions. After the political centralization of the 2000s fol-
lowing Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and the drop in 
5 Kozina, I. ed. (2009) Profsojuzy na predpriyatiyah sovremennoi 
Rossii: vozmozhnosti rebrendinga, Moskva.
6 Информационный сборник от VII к IX съезду ФНПР (2011–
2015 гг.)
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the number of parties competing for seats in the Duma, 
the unions’ main electoral strategy was concentrated 
on building an alliance with the ruling party “United 
Russia.” Union leader Andrey Isaev has become a leader 
of the United Russia Duma faction. Finally, after the 
political liberalization of 2012, trade unions converted 
“The Union of Labor” political movement into the “first 
laborist party in the history of Russian trade unions.”7
The evolution of the lobbying strategies of trade 
unions was similarly flexible. In the beginning of the 
1990s, lobbying activities were mainly reduced to infor-
mal ties with individual deputies and bureaucrats in state 
executive bodies. After its success in the 1999 elections, 
FNPR created an informal inter-factional group “Sol-
idarity” in the State Duma for building ties with rep-
resentatives of different political factions; this institu-
tion has been reproduced in all subsequent parliaments. 
FNPR has been using every opportunity to extend its 
functional representation in legislative and governmen-
tal bodies via participation in various Duma committees, 
expert councils and commissions. The Vice-Chairman 
of FNPR Andrey Isaev has become a constant repre-
sentative of the FNPR in the State Duma. In 1999, he 
was elected Vice Chair of the Duma Committee on 
Labor and Social Policy and Veteran Affairs and con-
tinued working as a Chair of that Committee in the 
fourth and the fifth Duma. In 2014, Isaev became a 
Vice-Chair of the State Duma, in 2016, he was elected 
the First Deputy Head of the United Russia faction for 
legislative activities.
Direct Political Participation as a 
Sustainable Institution
Electoral and lobbying mechanisms used by Russian 
trade unions today are well incorporated into state polit-
ical and governance systems. The main electoral “loco-
motive” promoting FNPR representatives to the parlia-
ment is the ruling party United Russia (UR). In the 2016 
elections, nine FNPR officials were elected to the State 
Duma as candidates from United Russia (four of them 
were elected on the basis of the federal party list, five are 
deputies from single-member districts). Another 18 rep-
resentatives of FNPR promoted by UR were elected to 
regional parliaments. FNPR can also advance its repre-
sentatives into legislative bodies on the non-party basis 
as a member of the Putin-made coalition “All-Russia 
People’s Front” (ONF). At the regional and local levels, 
some trade unions are active in building alliances with 
official opposition parties—Just Russia and Commu-
nists. Additionally, after the political liberalization of 
7 Информационный сборник от VII к IX съезду ФНПР (2011–
2015 гг.)
2012, FNPR converted its former Union of Labor pub-
lic movement into a political party that has branches in 
53 regions. Although the party failed in the 2016 Duma 
elections, the FNPR Committee for Political Analysis 
and Action considers its preservation and further devel-
opment as a complementary political tool.
The main lobbying instrument of FNPR in the State 
Duma is the informal interfactional group Solidarity. 
In the 2016 Duma, 18 deputies representing three par-
liamentary factions have already joined the Solidarity 
group. In spite of its informal status, the group has 
become a strong institutional lever allowing the FNPR 
to participate in legislative activity. The FNPR con-
stantly works on strengthening its representation in the 
Committee on Labor and Social Policy and Veteran 
Affairs. Although Andrey Isaev is no longer the Chair 
of the Committee, the leadership positions of the First 
Vice-Chair and the Vice-Chair still belong to FNPR rep-
resentatives. In recent years, FNPR has been extending 
its functional representation in the Duma and govern-
mental bodies via participation in various expert coun-
cils and commissions. In 2012, the Rector of the St. 
Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions 
Aleksandr Zapesotsky became the Head of the newly 
created Expert Council for the Committee of Labor and 
Social Policy. In the new 2016 Duma, the Expert Coun-
cil includes nine FNPR high-ranking officials. Another 
four FNPR officials represent trade unions in the Pub-
lic Council by the Ministry of Labor that was created in 
2013 to promote initiatives for optimization of the state 
social and labor policy. Although the decisions of the 
Council have only recommendatory character, it serves 
as an effective “access point” for trade unions to pro-
mote initiatives to the state executive bodies.
As in any authoritarian regime, building direct ties 
with the authoritarian ruler is the key political strategy. 
FNPR bet on Putin since his first election in 2000 and 
maintained its loyalty to him during Medvedev’s pres-
idency. Trade unions served as one of the pillars of 
Putin’s electoral campaign in 2012 using their broad 
mobilization resources to draw support for the president 
during elections and organizing mass rallies to defend 
the president against the “white revolution” of 2011–
12. This loyalty paid off after Putin returned to power. 
Among his first decrees was one on the reconstruction of 
the Ministry of Labor, which was something the unions 
had demanded for over eight years, ever since the min-
istry’s liquidation in 2004.
Russian trade unions are not exceptional in terms 
of using informal ties to advance labor interest repre-
sentation. In European countries, unions often resort to 
informal links to influence politicians and state officials. 
This phenomenon is referred to as the “gray power” of 
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trade unions. With the spread of neo-liberalism under-
mining corporatist systems, trade unions in European 
countries increasingly resort to political levers, includ-
ing informal links with political parties and state offi-
cials. However, in contrast to European countries where 
unions use “grey power” as a complementary political 
lever, in Russia the direct involvement of trade unions 
in politics and electoral activities are informal by def-
inition. Political strategies are realized beyond official 
institutions of social partnership, and are based mainly 
on informal and inter-personal ties. The non-democratic 
nature of the Russian political environment results in 
a situation when trade unions ally not with socio-dem-
ocratic political forces (as they do in European democ-
racies), but just with the most powerful player on the 
political field, which is the ruling party and, even more 
important, with President Putin in person.
Social Partnership and Involvement in 
Politics as “Parallel” Institutions: The “Dual” 
System of Labor Interest Representation
The involvement of Russian trade unions in policymak-
ing is realized today via two institutional mechanisms 
that comprise the “dual” system of labor interest rep-
resentation. One of them is the formal neo-corporat-
ist institution of social partnership, and the other is 
the informal institution of direct political involvement. 
These “parallel” institutions do not compete with each 
other, but rather complement each other to strengthen 
trade unions’ influence on policymaking. The institu-
tions demonstrate different capacities for development 
due to the differences in their origins and character. The 
borrowed system of social partnership has only a limited 
ability to change because it was imposed “from above” 
with a politically and ideologically predetermined design. 
The institution of direct political participation, on the 
contrary, developed as a bottom-up process by adjust-
ing to the challenges of the Russian political and eco-
nomic context. The flexibility of the political institution 
was facilitated by its basically informal character, mean-
ing that political participation was realized beyond offi-
cial neo-corporatist institutions and strongly based on 
informal inter-personal networks.
The informal character of trade unions’ strategies 
makes it difficult to assess the actual influence of trade 
unions on policymaking. There are no empirical studies 
of the FNPR’s legislative efforts; the only source for 
analysis so far is official FNPR reports. However, com-
paring the two mechanisms of labor interest represen-
tation we can assume that Russian trade unions have 
achieved more influence in policymaking through infor-
mal political channels than via formal social partner-
ship mechanisms. Since 2000, FNPR claims to have 
promoted over 300 amendments to the Labor Code 
due to its lobbying activity in the parliament. Accord-
ing to the Report to the IX Congress of FNPR in 2016, 
during the period of 2011–2015, FNPR specialists pro-
vided expertise on 374 draft laws, 68 of which became 
federal laws. Among other achievements in policymak-
ing, the report mentions adoption of a federal law pro-
hibiting agency labor and a number of laws improv-
ing pensions for the workers in the Far North. The list 
of “success stories” also includes blocking adoption of 
the liberal version of the Labor Code by the Solidarity 
group in 2000 and reestablishment of the Ministry of 
Labor in 2012.
While tripartism is the most desirable way for Rus-
sian trade unions to participate in policymaking, direct 
political involvement is a rather forced strategy. In the 
90s, trade unions were involved in politics largely for 
their own institutional survival. The increasing use of 
political tools after 2000 was as a compensation for the 
inability of the neo-corporatist institutions to confront 
the growing liberal trends in the economy that the new 
Labor Code failed to improve. Today, Russian trade 
unions try to use their institutional capacity acquired 
through political channels to improve tripartite institu-
tions of social partnership. In 2015, due to the FNPR’s 
lobbying initiatives, the government approved amend-
ments to the law on the Russian Tripartite Commission, 
which strengthened its role in the development of leg-
islative documents on labor and social issues. In partic-
ular, the amendments have made obligatory consider-
ation of the bills by the RTC before their approval by 
the government, and participation of social partners in 
the government meetings addressing the issues of social 
and labor relations.
Overall, the “dual” system of labor interest repre-
sentation in today’s Russia reflects specific features of 
the policymaking process in hybrid political regimes. 
Although formally the basic institutions of social part-
nership and direct political involvement resemble their 
analogues in Western democracies, they perform differ-
ently adapting to the peculiarities of the Russian politi-
cal environment and market economy. The actual impact 
of trade unions on labor policy remains underestimated 
and requires further research.
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STATISTICS
Labor Protests in Russia
All the figures below come from the Center for Social and Labor Rights (CSLR) in Moscow. CSLR is a Russian non-
profit NGO devoted to the promotion of, compliance with and protection of social and labor rights.
Figure 1: Total Number of Labor Protest Actions 2008–2016
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Figure 2: Organizers of Labour Protest Actions 2008–2016 (share in total number of protests)
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Figure 3: Total Number of Labor Protest Actions in 2016
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Russian Trade Unions in International Comparison
The following figures come from the International Labour Organisation ILOSTAT—Industrial relations. The only 
tripartite U.N. agency, the ILO brings together governments, employers and worker representatives of 187 member 
States, to set labor standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men.
Figure 1: Trade Union Density in International Comparison (2012/13)
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Note: Newest data available. Trade union density indicates the share of employees with trade union membership among the total number 
of employees in the country. It does not consider trade union members who lack employment status.
Source: International Labour Organisation ILOSTAT – Industrial relations, <http://www.ilo.org/ilostat>
Figure 2: Collective Bargaining Coverage in International Comparison (2012/13)
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Note: Data for all countries included in Figure 1 where data are available. The collective bargaining rate indicates the share of employ-
ees covered by collective bargaining in the total number of employees with the right to collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is the 
negotiation process between employers and a group of employees, commonly represented by trade unions, over agreements to regulate pay-
ment and working conditions.
Source: International Labour Organisation ILOSTAT – Industrial relations, <http://www.ilo.org/ilostat>
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